It has been often argued that parentheticals, discourse adverbials and certain parts of speech like interjections do not contribute to the truth conditional content of the assertions of which they are part. In this paper I argue that many of these constructions do contribute a truth conditional content, and I propose a semantics for parentheticals and discourse adverbials that treats these constructions similarly to SDRT's treatment of presuppositions. I also point out differences between standard presupposition triggers on the one hand and parentheticals or discourse adverbials on the other.
INTRODUCTION
There is a tradition in pragmatics going back at least to Grice according to which certain constructions and parts of speech do not contribute to the truth conditional content of the assertions of which they are part. Rather they implicate or indicate either a particular speech act or an attitude of the speaker. Examples of such items are: 9 mood indicators-questions, commands.
• interjections-Oh, Gee, Too bad, Damn, etc. a so called discourse adverbials-allegedly, unfortunately, etc. This category also includes adverbial clauses-e.g. as Mary assures us.
« so called pragmatic conditionals-if you know what I mean, if you see what I'm
getting at. © discourse particles-tte in Japanese or re in Sissala for hearsay.
• discourse connectors-but, too, hence, so, therefore, etc. « parenthetical constructions, in which full clauses missing a verbal complement occur. Wilson (1975) and others have argued that all of these phenomena exhibit a similar behavior relative to a test for non-truth conditional meaning-the 'embedding test'. Sperber & Wilson (1995) also claim that they can give a unified analysis of these phenomena. However, I will argue here that the test does not really separate out parts of speech with a non-truth conditional meaning (whatever that might be is not my concern here). Certainly, there is reason to doubt that all of these constructions fail to be amenable to truth conditional or, more generally, model theoretic analysis.
Some mood indicators have received detailed and rigorous model theoretic analysis in e.g. Hintikka (i 974) and Groenendijk & Stokhof (1984) . Others have argued that discourse connectors have an important though sometimes subtle effect on the truth conditional interpretation of discourse (Asher 1993; Lascarides & Asher 1993) and that hence traditional pragmatics gives a misleading picture of discourse interpretation by separating out the contribution of discourse connectors from an account of truth conditional content. Similar remarks apply to the Japanese discourse particle tte (Hasegawa 1996) . In this paper I will examine parentheticals and discourse adverbials. Some examples of parentheticals are given in (1) below (the parentheticals are underlined). I will argue that these parts of speech also have a straightforward truth conditional semantics in a theory of discourse interpretation that takes account of discourse structure. The theory of discourse interpretation that I will use is SDRT (Asher 1993 , Lascarides & Asher 1993 , an extension of DRT that incorporates an account of discourse structure and rhetorical function.
(1) a. The party is over, I hear.
b. Please leave, I beg you. c. The party, Mary assures us, is over.
A TEST FOR NON TRUTH CONDITIONAL MEANING?
According to Wilson (1975) , there is a test for non truth conditional meaning: embed the questionable item into the antecedent of a conditional and see if the purported truth conditional contributor's meaning falls within the scope of 'if. If it does, it is truth conditional; and if not, not. Here are some examples of the test at work: (2) a. If the party, unfortunately, is over, then we should find somewhere else to get a drink.
If it is unfortunate that the party is over, then we should find somewhere else to get a drink b. If the sun is shining but it's midnight, then we must be in Norway.
If the sun is shining and it's midnight and that's not expected, then we must be in Norway. c. If, I'm warning you, you cross that line, I'll hit you.
If I'm warning you that you cross that line, I'll hit you.
According to the test, these examples appear to indicate that neither parentheticals, discourse adverbials, nor discourse particles have a truth conditional import, because their supposed content cannot embed inside a conditional. But this conclusion is too hasty. According to this test, nonrestricted relative clauses and appositive NPs would fail to have a truth conditional import, when they obviously do:
(3) If the party, which Jane attended, is over, then we should find somewhere else to get a drink.
If the party is over and Jane attended that party, then we should find somewhere else to get a drink. (4) If the party, that one that Jane is hosting, is over, then we should find somewhere else to get a drink.
If the party is over and Jane is hosting that party, then we should find somewhere else to get a drink.
Crucially, what is wrong with the test for non-truth conditional meaning is that it overlooks the obvious possibility that the content of the apparently non-truth conditional item may simply fall outside the scope of the conditional but nevertheless contribute to the truth conditions of the discourse. Before dismissing this test, it is nevertheless important to note that it does render very dubious an account of parentheticals as syntactically displaced constituents. Such a simple account of parentheticals would see the examples in (1) as equivalent to sentences in which the main clause is a complement to the expression in the parenthetical. Thus, (ic) would be equivalent to (5) Mary assures us that the party is over.
Although this sounds initially plausible, this fails to explain a difference in the discourse behavior of (ic) and (5). The latter, but not the former, can be questioned or undercut by Does she?:
(6) a. # A: The party, Mary assures, is over. B: Does she? b. A: Mary assures us that the party is over. B: Does she?
Further, once the parenthetical occurs within a clause of a complex sentence like those used in the embedding test, this simple syntactic account makes the wrong predictions, as we will see below. Finally, convincing, syntactic evidence that parentheticals, discourse adverbials and interjections remain unattached 'orphans' at syntactic structure has been given by Haegeman (1991) (see also Haegeman 1984) . Thus, if we are to provide a unified interpretation for sentences containing parentheticals or discourse adverbials, we will have to move to a semantic or even pragmatic-semantic account of logical form, which is what I turn to now.
A POSITIVE ACCOUNT

The basics
Parentheticals and discourse adverbials share several features with presuppositions. First, both typically project out of the context in which they are introduced. Projection means that presuppositions also fail the 'test' for truth conditional meaning propounded by Wilson:
(7) If the King of Buganda is bald, then he wears a wig in public. ? -> If there is a King of Buganda and the King of Buganda is bald, then he wears a wig in public.
Second, parentheticals, discourse adverbials and presuppositions all typically convey propositions, once certain anaphorically underspecified elements are resolved. Asher and Lascarides (1998b) present an SDRT account of presuppositions according to which presuppositions must be attached to some antecedent, available part of the discourse context via a restricted range of discourse relations that represent their discourse function. These two relations are Background, in which the presupposition gives some stage setting information about one or more elements in the main narrative line of the text, and Defeasible Consequence, in which the presupposition is a defeasible consequence of the constituent to which it is related. One of these two relations always attaches a presupposition to the discourse context, unless the presupposition trigger itself specifies a discourse relation; for instance, the presupposition trigger too introduces the discourse relation Parallel, as argued in Asher (1993)-Following van der Sandt's account, the SDRT account of presupposition supposes that presuppositions that cannot be derived from or 'bound to' the context (and so attached with Defeasible Consequence) prefer an attachment to as superordinate a position as possible in the discourse context (the counterpart to van der Sandt's rule of wide scope accommodation). Let us now see how parentheticals are anaphoric and express propositions. In SDRT parentheticals, like presuppositions and ordinary assertions, must attach to some part of the discourse context via a discourse relation. Parentheticals prefer a different attachment to presuppositions: they typically attach to a discourse constituent formed from the asserted clause or sentence in which they are embedded, whereas presuppositions can attach at any available position and even prefer high attachment with Background. Some parentheticals-viz. the epithets, expressions like he commented, and many discourse adverbials-determine a particular discourse relation like Commentary. Others encode the rhetorical functions used to attach their propositional content in their main verbs, as in Mary assures us. On the other hand, parentheticals containing main verbs that express a relations between speech acts such as Mary explained, Mary elaborated, Mary replied function like the presupposition trigger too; they simply express a proposition containing a discourse relation that is to be used in attaching the clause surrounding them to antecedent material-consider, for example, the parenthetical in (8):
(8) As I entered the class I saw a student rush out in tears. The boy, the teacher explained, had just failed his exam.
With this in mind let us now consider an example of a parenthetical and how to treat it.
(9) John, Mary assures us, can be trusted.
I will assume that syntax can isolate out the parenthetical and that lexical analysis will reveal that verbs used in our parenthetical examples like assure, hope, fear as well as sentence adverbials like unfortunately have an argument that needs to be specified. SDRT takes a sentence like (9), and indeed any discourse, to produce an SDRS, which we can think of as a pair consisting of a set A of labels and a function T that maps elements of A into formulas (e.g. DRSs and SDRSs) representing the content of the labeled constituents (see e.g. Asher 1997 ). The parenthetical and main clause then for (9) will each generate a DRS with a label; in addition the parenthetical, like a presupposition, will introduce a discourse relation R that relates the parenthetical element to some other label standing for some other discourse constituent. However, the compositional semantics of the parenthetical does not by itself specify either what R or the other discourse constituent is. I will use the following representation for the SDRS for (9). , ? 7 j j can be trusted In (10) 7r labels the constituent derived from the parenthetical material, here represented as a DRS; p stands for the object of assure that has yet to be specified; R stands for a yet to be specified discourse relation; and v is the label of a yet to be specified attachment point for the parenthetical constituent. Compositional semantics gets us a logical form for the assertion minus the parenthetical-which I will label with n'. The rule for processing parentheticals resolves the underspecified condition v = ? to v -IT', while the resolution of the underspecified conditions p = ? and R = ? is left to independent processes of anaphora resolution and SDRT's computation of discourse relations respectively. In this case, there is only one proposition in the context to identify with p-the proposition that John can be trusted. And the relation R can be specified given the content of the parenthetical to Evidence. On this analysis, we have a pretty straightforward truth conditional analysis of parentheticals:
My account is slightly more complicated than one might think necessary. Why must we, one might argue, attach the parenthetical with a discourse relation to some constituent? Could we not just assume that p is always identified with the entire surrounding assertion, thus reviving the syntactic analysis at the level of logical form? On this simpler proposal, we would predict (9) to be equivalent to:
(11) Mary assures us that John can be trusted.
This account could be used to get wide scope readings of the parenthetical material for the embedding test sentences. Thus, something like (2c) would be equivalent to:
(12) I'm warning you that if you cross the line, I'll hit you.
This proposal is very similar to the syntactic proposal of the previous section, but it escapes the syntactic criticisms of the earlier view. On the other hand, the equivalences this account predicts do not explain the differences in discourse behavior exemplified in (6a,b). This view also predicts incorrect truth conditional equivalences. Consider:
(13) a. Mary assures us that John can be trusted, but I don't trust him.
b. John, Mary assures us, can be trusted, but I don't trust him.
Informants find (13b) odd. And the reason, I think, is that the use of certain parentheticals that use evidential verbs like assure, swear, testify and affirm prefer attachment with the relation Evidence, which affect the speaker's commitment to the constituent to which the parenthetical attaches. To be more precise, the Evidence relation is what one might call a veridical relation; if a speaker is committed to Evidence ( TT ,, 7r 2 ), then he is also committed to the truth of the contents associated with the labels 7r, and n z .
More formally, where ; is interpreted as dynamic conjunction and where K n represents the DRS associated with the label n, we have:
With this constraint it is evident that (13 b) becomes inconsistent. The simple non-discourse based story cannot make such a difference between (13a) and (13b). Further, other parentheticals that induce other discourse relations do not give rise to the sort of difference observed in (13a) and (13b). Consider, for instance, the parenthetical in (15a) and its non-parenthetical counterpart in (15b):
(15) a. Mary, we supposed, could not be trusted. But we were wrong. She is completely trustworthy. b. We supposed that Mary could not be trusted. But we were wrong.
She is completely trustworthy.
There is a non-veridical relation between the parenthetical in (15a) and the main clause; the fact that we supposed Mary could not be trusted gives as a reasonable but defeasible consequence that she was not trustworthysomething that SDRT models with the relation Defeasible Consequence, according to which the fact that Mary is not trustworthy cannot be inferred if this is inconsistent with the information given (see Asher & Lascarides 1998b for details). In fact the defeasible consequence that Mary is not trustworthy is blocked in (15a). So Defeasible consequence is non-veridical, because it does not entail the truth of the formulas associated with the labels that are its terms. In fact, it is the only non-veridical discourse relation for monologue. Thus, provided we infer a non-veridical rhetorical relation between the parenthetical and its attachment point, (15a) is predicted OK and there is no difference of acceptability between (15a) and (15b). A more adequate treatment of evidential parentheticals has to add an additional parameter to the evidential relation. Evidence is always evidence for someone, and the cases we have considered so far only consider the cases where Evidence is Evidence for the speaker. Here's an example where the Evidence relation holds for the agent Paul in the example but not, presumably, for the speaker.
(16) John, Mary assured Paul, could be trusted. So Paul gave him his apartment while he went on vacation. When he came back, he found that the apartment had been ransacked.
• Constraint on Evidence for 5 Evidence-for 5 (7r, 7r,) -> S believes that (K n ;K ni ) I will use this parametrized version of the Evidence relation below. Discourse factors also explain the unacceptability of (6a). Let us suppose that we have an SDRS for the first sentence such that the parenthetical (TT) is evidence for the main clause (TI^). Thus, we have Evidence^, 7r,). SDRT'S principles of discourse attachment say that we can only attach new information to 7r, or to the label for the entire SDRS; ir is not on the right frontier of graph of this SDRS and so is not accessible (see Asher 1993 for details). Yet the question Does she? in (6a) should attach to TT, as it is intuitively only Mary's assuring that is being questioned. The clash between the attachment constraint and the evidence discourse function of the question thus account for the oddity of (6a).
A final difference between the simpler account and my discourse based account is that mine predicts better when some parentheticals do not work. A purely semantic (or syntactic) account must either accept (iybcd) or reject them all. The verbs of these parentheticals have the same sort of semantic object, which, I argued in Asher (1993) , is not what is given by the indicative main clause in these examples. But because on this account parentheticals have an anaphorically specified argument, we can speculate that some coercion or bridging inferences are allowed. Bridging inferences are typically subject to certain rhetorical constraints (Asher & Lascarides 1998 a) , and we see this in evidence here. A clear rhetorical connection for the parenthetical helps us find the appropriate anaphoric object. For instance, (17b) is perfectly fine; there is a clear rhetorical relation between begging someone to leave and the person's having or being obligated to leave. Being obliged to leave has as a natural result the action of leaving; there is a natural Narrative link between the two. For (17c), however, the rhetorical relation is not at all clear, nor again for (i7d). Or at least you would need a particular context where someone's begging you to be tired obliges you to be tired and where the concept ofbeing obliged to be tired makes sense. A story that does not take rhetorical relations seriously cannot account for the differences between (17b) and (17c) in any way, as far as I can see.
Attachments and parentheticals in complex assertions
The discourse based account of parentheticals just sketched leaves open exactly what an appropriate attachment point for the parenthetical is. In the simple example (9) above, the entire assertion served as attachment point. What about more complex sentences? On the one hand, we have wide scope readings of parentheticals.
(18) a. Only if, I fear, we work like dogs, will we be able to save this company. b. Even if, I hear, the reception's over, we'll still be able to get something to eat. c. If, I'm warning you, you cross that line, I'll hit you.
These examples all seem to invite at least the reading on which the parenthetical's anaphoric argument p is identified with the entire assertion surrounding the parenthetical.
On the other hand, we have examples in which a parenthetical or discourse adverbial has scope over the consequent, at least according to one informant.
(19) If the party, unfortunately, is over, then we have to go somewhere else to get a drink For this informant, the most salient interpretation of (19) is that if the party is over, then we should find somewhere else to get a drink and it is unfortunate that we should find somewhere else to get a drink. This attachment is one that is quite different from a presupposition, since the parenthetical is attached and resolved to some non-accessible element in the discourse structure (following van der Sandt). But it is a matter of cataphoric resolution of an underspecification, which should be admissible in so far as other cataphoric links are admissable.
On the other hand, many people find it easy to attach parenthetical material or a discourse adverbial surrounded by the antecedent of a conditional to that antecedent. The following three examples show a diversity of interpretations, however.
(20) a. If the party, as Mary assures us, is over, then we should find somewhere else to get a drink b. If the party, unfortunately, is over, then we should find somewhere else to get a drink c. If the party, unfortunately, is over, then we should go home.
In (20a) the discourse adverbial takes the antecedent of the main assertion in its scope and attaches with Background to the conditional. The most salient reading of (20a) is: Mary assures us that the party is over, and if the party is over, then we should find somewhere else to get a drink (20b) gives rise to two interpetations: (i) it is unfortunate that if the party is over, then we should find somewhere else to get a drink; (ii) if the party is over, then that is unfortunate and if the party is over we should find somewhere else to get a drink The first reading is a straightforward application of the account given so far, but what about the second? In fact the second seems more plausible.
To account for these various readings, we need to appeal in greater detail to the nature of discourse relations and attachment points in SDRT. The wide scope reading of (18a) can be understood as a Commentary on the assertion itself On this reading, (18a) is equivalent to:
(21) Only if we work like dogs, will we be able to save this company and, as a Commentary, I fear that only if we work like dogs, will we be able to save this company, This reading follows from our decision to treat the parenthetical as a real discourse constituent. There is perhaps also a narrower scope reading for (18a) where the Commentary extends only over the antecedent of the conditional-more on this below. The other two examples of widescope readings generate other relations than Commentary in the attachment reasoning process. The parenthetical / hear generates an Evidence relation in the widescope reading for (18b) and is analyzed in a manner similar to (18a). For (18c), we need to ask: how does the warning that if you cross that line I will hit you relate to the assertion that if you cross that line I will hit you? The warning, it seems, has the assertion as a Result. Warnings are factive! The attachment possibilities for the parenthetical in these examples reflect the resolution of the anaphoric element. In fact in all of the examples (18), (19) and (20), the attachment point and the constituent identified as the complement of the parenthetical or discourse adverbial coincide. Why should this be? In general it is because of our relations Commentary and Evidence. In SDRT attachments are decided so as to maximize discourse coherence. This principle, Maximize Discourse Coherence, can be stated informally:
o Maximize Discourse Coherence: In updating a discourse context r with new information tfi, resolve all those underspecifications not resolved by the choice of a discourse relations or by constraints on discourse relations, lexical choice and logical form so as to produce an update that is T, <f> maximal.
A r,(f> maximal update is one in which a maximal number of underspecified elements have been resolved and in which each discourse relation in the structure is as coherent as it can be. Underlying this principle is the ' Commentary is a discourse relation in SDRT. For details, see Asher (1993) .
idea that many discourse relations are scalar-e.g. Parallel, Contrast, Explanation, and, especially for our purposes, Commentary and Evidence. These relations are maximally strong when we give evidence for or commentary on the whole of the constituent that is the attachment point. And this comes about precisely when we resolve the anaphoric element p in the representation of the parenthetical to the constituent that is the attachment site. This leaves open the question as to why the attachments and anaphoric resolutions are chosen the way they are. Maximize Discourse Coherence and other discourse factors influence these choices as well.
2 In analyzing various attachment possibilities, let us turn first to some examples of narrow scope or local attachments in (2o)-(2ob-c) and their more salient second readings. There is a conflict between the status the conditional confers on the proposition that the party is over and the way the adverbial together with its resolved argument gets attached to the discourse context. On my account, the adverbial gives rise to a labeled DRS K n containing the conditions Unfortunate(p) and p = ?; and on the reading we are interested in here, p is identified with the proposition K ni , expressed by antecedent of the conditional, in which the parenthetical is embedded and which I will label 7T,. The natural, albeit defeasible, resolution of the underspecified discourse relation between IT and its attachment point TT,, is Commentary, as is suggested by the adverbial itself. But Commentary, like many discourse relations in SDRT, is veridical; i.e. Commentary(TT,, 7r 2 ) -> {K^^K^^, where K n is the constituent DRS or SDRS associated with the label n and ';' represents again dynamic conjunction. Further, Unfortunate(p) generates the presupposition that the proposition identified with p is true. So on this way of interpreting the adverbial, we imply that the party in fact is over, but this conflicts with dependence of this constituent on the antecedent of the conditional. In SDRT the presence of a conditional operator signals a discourse relation between labels for the conditional's antecedent and consequent. This is again the relation Defeasible Consequence that I introduced earlier, and it is non-veridical. Now there is a pragmatic conflict generated by two modes of attachment for the discourse constituent ir in (2obc). The attachment of IT, via Commentary signals a speaker's commitment to the truth of the related constituents and hence to K^, whereas the attachment of 7r, to the • There may also be other elements at work, like the position of the parenthetical and the intonational contour used with it. Further, negative Commentaries like^ear or unfortunately will be less coherent as a rule when they are attached to what are seen as positive outcomes (e.g. turning the company around), and so such attachments will be in general dispreferred. An analysis of these lexical and intonational factors I leave for another time.
consequent of the conditional via Defeasible Consequence signals that the speaker is not committed to the truth of the constituent. The same analysis holds if we try to resolve p to the consequent of the conditional in these examples, which does not seem to be a very salient reading here but is for How then can we attach the expression of the author's opinion to the antecedent in (2obc)? SDRT resolves this conflict by overriding the defeasible preference for using Commentary with this discourse adverbial of attaching K n to the context in favor of attaching it with the one nonveridical rhetorical relation for monologue, Defeasible Consequence, in which the suppositional, non-established character of the antedecent of (19) is preserved. On this way of attaching K n , the presupposition generated by the adverbial can also be bound. In fact, we can bring forward the following generalization:
(22) When a preferred veridical relation cannot be used because of conflict with the non-veridical, conditional status of the chosen attachment point 7r, attach with Defeasible Consequence to n.
This generalization accounts for the conditional reading of the parenthetical in (2ob-c). Now why does (20a) lack a conditional reading? The main verb in the parenthetical and its subject in this example indicates that the relation to be used for attachment is Evidence with the agent parameter filled in by a group that includes the speaker. Our parametrized and more sophisticated version of the Evidence relation, while not veridical, can entail a doxastic commitment by the speaker that would conflict with the context as in (13b). But the constituent for which the parenthetical provides evidence in (20a) as opposed to (13b) is irrealis, so the doxastic commitment by the speaker is rendered moot and there is no conflict between the implications of the Evidence relation and the non-veridicality of the attachment point. Further, although the parenthetical attaches to the antecedent, the adverbial does not generate a presupposition that its propositional object is true, although this is what happens in (2obc). Hence, there is not any conflict in (20a) between the nonfactual status of the proposition that the party is over that comes from the conditional and the factual status of the same proposition that comes from the adverbial. So there is no need for the SDRT construction procedure to override the default attachment of the constituent constructed from the adverbial to the outside context. So our analysis can also predict that (20a) lacks a conditional reading.
Scopes of Discourse Relations and Continuing Discourse Patterns
My analysis of the parentheticals in (20) is part of a more general strategy for resolving conflicts between veridical and non veridical discourse relations. Consider examples like the following that are related to the phenomenon of modal subordination noticed by Roberts (1987) . (23) Both (23a) and (23b) exhibit in the first sentence some sort of conditional which generates the Defeasible Consequence, non-veridical relation between constituents. In both examples (?r 3 ) must be attached to the consequent of the conditionals if the anaphoric pronoun is to get an antecedent. But there is a potential conflict between the entailment of the veridical relation-Parallel(TT 2 , TT 3 ) in (23a) forced by the particle too and Narration(7r 2 ,7r 3 ) in (23b) inferred from the presence of then-and the rhetorical point of the non-veridical conditional. That is, if the truth of K-Ki and K n} is entailed by the veridical relation, then why is the truth of K n2 asserted only relative to some supposition from which it follows only defeasibly in the first sentence? This is not an outright contradiction, but it makes the point of asserting the conditional very unclear-indeed we might say that the discourse is pragmatically incoherent. In (23 a), although both veridical and non-veridical relations are involved, the attachment of the parenthetical is unproblematic. This is because the scopes of the respective discourse relations remove the clash between veridical and non-veridical relations. The scope of the non-veridical conditional relation is over both constituents (TT 2 ) and (?r 3 ) and the Parallel relation. Maximize Discourse Coherence will force us in effect to link (n 2 ) and (7r 3 ) together to form a new constituent that becomes the consequent of the conditional. This is a coherent discourse structure and there is no clash between veridical and non-veridical relations. But there must be constraints on when such new constituents can be formed, because Maximize Discourse Coherence does not allow us to form them in all cases-viz. (23b). Given a situation where we have R(a, 0) and R is non-veridical, we will be able to attach 7 to (3 via some veridical relation R 1 , only if 7 also bears R to a. This leaves open the possibility of attaching to some parent of a and /?, e.g. some constituent that contains both. In earlier work on largerscale patterns of discourse structure, colleagues and I argued that two constituents could be attached together in a subordinate structure to a third one only if the first two bore the same relations to the third-we called this constraint Continuing Discourse Patterns. Here we can motivate a similar principle about veridical and non-veridical relations from Maximize Discourse Coherence. The constraint below, mostly informal, nevertheless exploits the SDRT notation (T, Q, (3), which represents the attachment of a constituent (3 to a in the discourse context r. o Suppose from the discourse context one can defeasibly infer that a nonveridical relation R holds between a and /3-i.e. R (a, (3) . Then if 1. one cannot defeasibly infer from the context (r, a, 7) that R(a, 7) and 2. one cannot defeasibly infer from (r, (3.7) and the context that R' (/3, 7) , where R' is non-veridical. o then normally.-i(r,/3. 7).
This constraint makes conceptual sense: if you want a non-veridical relation to have scope over a veridical one, you had better make sure that both terms of the veridical relation are also within the scope of the non-veridical relation. A discourse structure in which this constraint does not hold will be far from maximally coherent. So one can see how Maximize Discourse Coherence would lead naturally to a constraint like Continuing Discourse Patterns.
I have referred to Continuing Discourse Patterns as a constraint only on attachments involving (3. But Maximize Discourse Coherence dictates a similar constraint for any attachments to a where a non-veridical relation R holds of a and (3. And it is just such a constraint from which we can derive (22) about parentheticals in conditional contexts-namely, that in attaching a parenthetical to the antecedent of a conditional, one must use the Conditional relation. For suppose that one wishes to attach new informaton (labeled by n 2 ) to an antecedent (labeled say by TT,) of a conditional. In order to satisfy Continuing Discourse Patterns, we must attach w 2 to n l with a non-veridical relation or we must be able to infer that TT 2 also can bear the Defeasible Consequence relation to whatever 7r,'s consequent is. As Defeasible Consequence is the only non-veridical relation in monologue unless we consider repairs, it is the only non-veridical relation with which to attach TT 2 .
One question that we have not yet answered is, why do parentheticals in conditionals apparently never have the scopes predicted by the simple account, as the embedding test shows? Could we not in fact have a situation of the following schematic sort: we have a conditional rf.rrI, then T , and a parenthetical .rr2 which is attached to rI via some veridical relation R but w i t h the scope of the conditional? Thus, we would have something like the following SDRS:
/ Defeasible Consequence(*, r3)
Note that this situation could only occur if we can derive Defeasible Consequence(r,, r 3 ) . But more is at stake here. This sort of attachment will not, for many sorts of conditionals like counterfactuals and even normal indicative conditionals, allow us to recover from any constituent what was asserted-namely, that KT, + KT,. A fundamental principle seems to be that while the addition of parenthetical information can change the discourse context and even the veridical status of the attachment point, it cannot make the information in the attachment point unrecoverable. To make this more precise, we need to recall the general definition of a discourse context as a pair consisting of a set A of labels and a function 3 that maps elements of A into formulas representing the content of the labeled constituents. More precisely, o Asserted content must be recoverable.
o Suppose that prior to attachment of parenthetical information a , we have asserted content 4. Then after integrating a into the discourse context T to get a context r', it must be the case that for some label a E T ' ,
The attachment of r, to r1 would make the original asserted content unrecoverable in the updated discourse structure. So if we adopt this principle about parenthetically used information, we predict that we cannot attach a parenthetical to the antecedent of a conditional by a relation other than Defeasible Consequence. Continuing Discourse Patterns also makes sense of those examples in which we have attachment to the second term of a non-veridical relatione.g. to the consequents of conditionals. examples. In (23a) Continuing Discourse Patterns does not fire; in addition to the veridical relation Parallel between 7r 2 and 7r 3 , we can establish given (r, 7r n 7r 2 ) a non-veridical conditional relation between 7r, and n } . In (23b), however, we cannot make the inference to establish that ?r 3 can be related via the conditional relation to TT,. The presence of the adverbial then breaks this inference. But it also forces us to infer a veridical discourse relation, Narration, with which we must attach 7r 3 . This means then that both conjuncts of Continuing Discourse Patterns are satisfied and so we cannot attach 7r 3 to TT 2 . The reason the discourse is odd is that if we do not attach n i to 7r 2 , then we cannot find, according to the DRT and SDRT constraints of accessibility and availability of anaphoric antecedents, an antecedent for the pronoun in 7r 3 .
An example similar to (23 a) that involves parentheticals is (19) . There is at least one reading, speakers report, on which the parenthetical can apparently attach to the consequent. In this example, the underspecified element p resolves to the consequent the conditional and we can then specify R to Commentary and attach the parenthetical to the consequent itself. How can this be according to our constraints? Well, this is allowed only if we can deduce Defeasible Consequence between the antecedent, the party's over, and it is unfortunate that we have to go somewhere else to get a drink.
But in effect the deduction is straightforward. The context already gives us the conditional that if the party is over, we'll have to go somewhere else to get a drink (A > B), while world knowledge should yield that if we have to go somewhere else that's unfortunate (B > C). Since indicative conditionals are at least defeasibly closed under transitivity (i.e., from A > B and B > C one may defeasibly infer A > C), we can deduce Defeasible Consequence between the antecedent and the content of the parenthetical in (19). So we can conclude that the relevant relation, Defeasible Consequence, holds between the antecedent and the parenthetical. Thus, our constraint of Continuing Discourse Patterns will not fire, and we can felicitously attach the parenthetical to the consequent in a maximally coherent discourse.
There are some apparent counterexamples to the application of Maximize Discourse Coherence that relies on Continuing Discourse Patterns. Consider the following (brought to my attention by Frank Veltman):
(25) a. If, as we have just learned, Kim has made an offer, we don't stand a chance. b. If, as we now know, Kim has made an offer, we don't stand a chance.
Here the author invites his audience to do a simple modus ponens. But note this is not really a conflict involving attachment. We might readily attach the parenthetical to the constituent formed by the entire previous sentence while nevertheless identifying the underspecified object argument of the propositional attitude verbs with the antecedent. There is a conflict here between the presupposed status of the complement in the parenthetical when it is attached with a veridical relation and its suppositional status as the antecedent to a conditional in the two examples. But the conflict is eliminated by making the inference to a suppressed conclusion. This type of structure is a compressed way of getting from accepted information to a new and perhaps unwelcome conclusion. One should note that the examples in (25) rely on the particular parentheticals used. The verbs in those parentheticals are both/active and epistemic and this seems essential to our intuitions that that sort of attachment pattern is possible. Other parentheticals as in (20) do not allow for that sort of attachment. Because Continuing Discourse Patterns is a default constraint on attachment, we can admit such specialized rhetorical patterns without inconsistency in this analysis. Default constraints sometimes are overridden in more specialized contexts, like those in which factive and epistemic parentheticals are present.
Continuing Discourse Patterns is a constraint on attachment. But there are others, as I intimated earlier. Interestingly, when we compare (19) to (20b), we see the attachment preference is determined by the choice of modal, 'unfortunately have to', 'unfortunately must' sound fine, whereas 'unfortunately should' sounds less good. Perhaps it is that the deontic should is not something that can be regretted, though vaguer doxastic or epistemic modalities like must can easily be regretted. More to the point, if something is to be regretted within a conditional, then normally one might think it is the consequences, unless those consequences are a matter of conditional obligation. Then one should regret the triggering cause or occasion of those obligations. For parentheticals then these observations set up a preference ordering for attaching parentheticals within conditionals not so unfamiliar from presuppositions: attach as low as is consistent with r, (f) maximality. In particular the choice of modal affects where a Commentary can be attached.
FURTHER ISSUES
There seems to be a division between parentheticals that happily undergo subject verb inversion and those that do not in English.
(26) The economy is no longer growing, reports the chief economist for Citycorp. (27) ? Please leave, beg you I.
Informants report that in some languages like German and French the inversion of saying verbs is obligatory. In Spanish and Portugese inversion is the default. In English it seems as though the inversion is largely stylistic. An informal survey of Reuters news articles reveals many parentheticals both in normal and in inverted order. On the other hand, there do seem to be syntactic constraints in German and French. It may even suggest that some elements really are extraposed and thus are distinct from the parentheticals analyzed here; that is, they simply are a syntactic rearrangement of one complex constituent rather than two distinct constituents. The syntactic extraposition cases seem, however, relegated largely to verbs of saying, for it is with these verbs that we see the inversions.
Another issue concerns extensions of this work There are some other examples of scope escaping elements that, though syntactically distinct from parentheticals and discourse adverbials, have similar semantic and pragmatic properties. These are the so-called pragmatic conditionals, studied, for instance, by Haegeman (1984) . I give some examples below. The analyses of these examples broadly follows the account already laid out for parentheticals. The antecedents of these conditionals are typically not giving propositions upon which the contents of the main clauses are truth conditionally dependent. Rather, like parentheticals, they take a wider scope. Many of these provide assumptions upon which the rhetorical functions of the main assertions depend. For this reason, the conditional antecedent takes scope over a particular rhetorical relation with which the main clause material is attached. Take, for instance, the first example (28 a). B's response to A's question that he knows one of the candidates is an answer to that question, provided that the claim in the conditional is correct-i.e. provided that the Piell he knows is the one who applied. Thus, the attachment of the conditional is much higher up in the discourse structure than the material surrounding the conditional. The conditional has scope over the discourse constituent containing the two questionanswer pairs (28a.i-iv) given earlier in the example. Similarly, we might take the conditional if you see what I mean in (28b) as a conditional taking wide scope over a question answer pair relation; the conditional says that if you understand what I'm getting at, then this will be an answer to the background question about what it is to remain faithful (see Haegeman 1984 for discussion). Some of the other examples are less clear-for instance, (28d). In that example, there's food in the fridge is a background premise to the unstated conclusion that the addressee can eat some of the food if he's hungry. Once again the attachment of the antecedent depends not on sentential syntax, however, but on discourse coherence considerations.
Haegeman analyzes these examples, along with parentheticals, using relevance theory. The antecedents of these conditionals are understood as facilitating access or otherwise enhancing the relevance of the material in the consequents. Haegeman's relevance theoretic analysis of pragmatic conditionals and parentheticals appears to be at a different level from the one proposed here; it tells us the speaker's goals behind the utterance of these conditionals. But it subscribes largely to the non-truth conditional view of these items, which it has been my principal aim to rebut. The SDRT analysis given here shows how parentheticals and pragmatic conditionals are just normal conditionals that make a truth conditional contribution to the content of the discourse. The purported difference between these examples and other examples of conditional sentences lies in the way the nuclear scope of these pragmatic conditionals is determined.
CONCLUSION
I have argued for the following. Parentheticals and discourse adverbials attach with discourse relations to the assertions or components thereof in which they are introduced. But their scopes are determined by a variety of intricate factors like Maximize Discourse Coherence and the resolution of conflicts between discourse relations. Parentheticals do not have the simple analysis presupposed in the embedding test, because they are distinct discourse constituents and must be attached via some discourse relation that interacts with the conditional. In this way, my account can explain away the phenomena noted by Wilson with the embedding test without endorsing the claim that parentheticals, discourse adverbials, or pragmatic conditionals have a 'non-truth conditional' semantics.
